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ALIEN INVASION: CORPORATE LIABILITY AND ITS REAL 
IMPLICATIONS UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Brian Jacek* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is part of the Federal Judiciary Act 
of 1789, which provides in its entirety: “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction in any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”1  Unlike other legislative enactments from the same time 
period, Congress provided virtually no legislative history in 
formulating the ATS.2  Instead, the text of the ATS itself is all lawyers 
and historians have to interpret its meaning.3  For nearly two 
centuries, this brief statute was largely forgotten and rarely invoked.4  
In the early 1980s, however, human-rights groups began to use the 
ATS as a mechanism for bringing human-rights lawsuits.5  Since then, 
district and circuit courts have tried, with extensive disagreement, to 
determine the meaning and scope of the ATS.6  The Supreme Court 
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 1  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 2  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–19 (2004).  Sosa was the first 
Supreme Court case to address the ATS.  Id.  There, the Justices went to great lengths 
to evaluate the history behind the ATS and to attempt to provide some insight into 
what the original Congress intended the Statute to mean.  See id.  
 3  Id. 
 4  See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  In one of 
the most recent circuit court cases involving the ATS, the D.C. Circuit in Doe VIII 
analyzed the history of ATS cases and the development of the corresponding legal 
doctrines.  See id. 
 5  See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 6  See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, No. 10-1491, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 17, 2011); Abdullahi v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 
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purported to clarify the ATS,7 but in reality, its decision only created 
more questions.8 
One open question generating considerable attention is whether 
corporations can be sued under the ATS for torts occurring in 
foreign countries.9  Circuit courts are bitterly split over the issue,10 
prompting a plethora of scholarly debate and public concern.11 
Corporations fear that their liability under the ATS will result in huge 
expenses and judgments and reduce their investments and profits.12  
But the issue of corporate liability concerns not only victims of 
human-rights abuses and corporations, but also much larger issues of 
human-rights law, foreign relations, and corporate responsibility.13  In 
assessing whether corporations can be sued under the ATS, courts 
must first decide whether international or domestic law governs the 
question.14  Second, courts must address whether that body of law 
recognizes corporate liability.15 
In Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (Doe VIII), the D.C. Circuit joined the 
Eleventh Circuit in holding that corporations can be sued under the 
ATS.16  In arriving at its conclusion, the court held that it must look at 
U.S. law, rather than the law of nations, to determine if corporations 
could be sued under the ATS.17  Essentially, the court held that under 
the ATS international law must recognize the tort alleged in the 
complaint, but U.S. law governs the question of who can be sued.18  
The court noted in dicta that, even if it were to apply international 
law to the question of who can be held liable under the ATS, it would 
 
(11th Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2005); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876; Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 7  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692.  
 8  See infra Part IV. 
 9  See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 15. 
 10  Circuit Judges within the same circuit often find themselves at odds with their 
colleagues.  See, e.g., Doe VIII, 654 F.3d 11; Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111.  Moreover, there is 
wide split between circuits that allow corporations to be sued under the ATS and 
circuits that do not.  See, e.g., id. 
 11  Cf. Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 18–20 (discussing the history of ATS claims and the 
disagreement about its applicability to corporations). 
 12  There are, perhaps, good reasons to fear these things.  See infra Part IV. 
 13  See infra Part V. 
 14  See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41. 
 15  See id. 
 16  Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 15. 
 17  Id. at 41. 
 18  Id. 
JACEK.DOX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:27 PM 
2013] COMMENT 275 
 
still arrive at the same conclusion.19  The D.C. Circuit’s holding stands 
in stark contrast to the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co. that international law governs the inquiry of who 
can be sued under the ATS.20  The Supreme Court has now granted 
certiorari and heard arguments in Kiobel and has the opportunity to 
resolve the question of whether corporations can be sued under the 
ATS.21 
Large multi-national corporations are terrified about the 
implications of corporate liability under the ATS.22  Specifically, they 
fear that corporate liability under the ATS may result in more 
frequent and more costly judgments, bad press, and may stymie 
corporate activity in developing countries.23  Fearful that liability 
under the ATS would result in a kind of corporate armageddon, 
corporations have challenged corporate liability under the ATS 
through the courts.24  This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit is 
correct that corporations can be held liable under the ATS.  
Furthermore, this Comment argues that corporate liability under the 
ATS will not be as detrimental as many corporate leaders and 
scholars contend.  Instead, corporate liability under the ATS is in line 
with legal precedent and facilitates domestic, foreign, and human-
rights policy goals.  Corporate liability under the ATS facilitates these 
goals without severely and negatively impacting business interests and 
development, both at home and abroad. 
Part II of this Comment briefly addresses the history of the ATS 
and recent developments in ATS jurisprudence, including the circuit 
split on corporate liability.  Part III analyzes the Doe VIII decision in 
detail by examining both the majority and dissenting opinions.  
Then, Part IV argues that the D.C. Circuit decided correctly in Doe 
VIII that domestic law rather than international law governs the 
question of who can be liable under the ATS.  Even if the D.C. Circuit 
was incorrect in deciding the case under domestic law, international 
law still recognizes corporate liability.  Part V examines the 
 
 19  Id. at 49. 
 20  See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127. 
 21  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 
17, 2011) (granting certiorari). 
 22  GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE 
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 1 (2003) (“This one-sentence law . . . could plausibly 
culminate in a nightmare, more than 200 years after it was enacted.”). 
 23  See id. 
 24  See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Kiobel, 
621 F.3d at 111.   
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implications of holding corporations liable under the ATS and will 
argue that doing so will not detrimentally and unjustly affect business.  
Moreover, corporate liability, in limited cases, will serve human rights 
and foreign relations public policy goals.  Part VI concludes, 
reiterating that both domestic and international law permit 
corporations to be sued under the ATS and that such a rule is not 
contrary to corporate or political concerns. 
II. HISTORY OF AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ATS JURISPRUDENCE 
The First Congress passed the ATS in 1789.25  There are many 
interpretations of the murky history behind its development and 
subsequent adoption.  The predominant narrative is that the ATS is 
the product of the realization that, at the founding of the nation, 
state courts were not properly equipped to handle judicial matters 
involving foreign nations.26  As a result, some scholars and 
commentators argue that the ATS was structured to bring matters of 
international importance into the federal courts in order to prevent 
mishandling in the state courts.27  Other scholars posit more generally 
that the ATS arose out of the inability of the Continental Congress to 
deal with issues of international importance, thereby damaging the 
new nation’s reputation abroad.28  These scholars argue that it was 
necessary to provide a forum in which international claims could be 
addressed in order to boost respect for the fledgling democracy, both 
politically and economically.29  Finally, some other scholars argue 
that, in fact, the meaning of the ATS can only be perceived through 
 
 25  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 26  See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Edwards, J., concurring); Carolyn A. D’Amore, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien 
Tort Statute: How Wide Has the Door to Human Rights Litigation Been Left Open?, 39 
AKRON L. REV. 593, 597 (2006). 
 27  See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782 (Edwards, J., concurring); D’Amore, supra note 
26, at 597. 
 28  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716–17 (2004); see Respublica v. 
DeLongchamps, 1 Dall. 111, 1 L. Ed. 59 (O. T. Phila. 1784).  The Sosa Court claims 
that the ATS arose out of the Marbois incident of May 1784, in which a Frenchman 
verbally assaulted the Secretary of the French Legion in Philadelphia.  Sosa, 542 U.S. 
at 716–17 (citing Respublica, 1 Dall.).  Until that point, Congress had not vested the 
courts with power to deal with matters arising out of or pertaining to the law of 
nations.  See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717.  Frustrated with the court’s inability to deal with 
the issue, the French launched a formal protest with the new government.  See id.  
Worried that the incident may cause international backlash and undermine the new 
nation’s credibility, Congress decided to include in the new Judiciary Act a provision 
that would become known as the ATS.  See id. 
 29  D’Amore, supra note 26. 
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an understanding of what the words in the ATS meant at the time of 
its drafting.30  According to these scholars, the word “foreigner” was 
changed to “alien” during drafting, which reflects a conscious 
decision by the Founders to include only people who would have 
been considered “aliens” under the eighteenth-century meaning of 
that word, i.e., only individuals born in other nations but residing in 
the United States.31  Few courts or academics, however, give this view 
credence. 
Whatever its original purpose, plaintiffs rarely used the ATS; in 
fact, district courts applied it only twice between 1789–1980.32  The 
ATS remained largely forgotten or ignored until 1980, when the 
Second Circuit applied the ATS in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.33  There, a 
dissident Paraguayan family, the Filartigas, brought an action against 
Américo Norberto Peña-Irala (Peña), who allegedly tortured and 
killed their son, Joelito.34  The Filartigas commenced a criminal 
action in Paraguayan courts, which failed because of the hostile 
political environment there.35  When Joelito’s sister Dolly came to the 
United States to seek asylum, she learned that her brother’s 
murderer, Peña, was residing in the United States.36  As a result, she 
filed suit in the United States under the ATS claiming that Peña 
caused Joelito’s wrongful death by torture in violation of the law of 
nations.37 
Applying the ATS for the first time in a circuit court, the Second 
Circuit held that the Filartigas’s claims had merit under international 
law.38  Specifically, the court held that the law of nations prohibits 
torture, and as a result, the Filartigas could bring their action against 
 
 30  M. Anderson Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original 
Language of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 316, 320–21 (2009). 
 31  Berry, supra note 30 (arguing that “[i]t is fair to say that an understanding of 
what Congress intended by the deceptively simple change from ‘foreigner’ to ‘alien’ 
was a narrowing of the ATS; making it available to ‘aliens’ but not to ‘foreigners.’  In 
other words, making it only available to residents of the United States”).  This 
argument is given little credence in modern ATS jurisprudence and has never been 
discussed in a circuit opinion in depth, largely because it is a new and facially 
innocuous.  
 32  See, e.g., Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. 
Cas. 819, F. Cas. No. 1607 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607). 
 33  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 34  Id. at 878. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. at 879. 
 38  Id. at 884. 
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Peña in the United States under the ATS.39  As the Supreme Court 
described, the Filartiga case was “the birth of the modern line of 
[ATS] cases.”40  In essence, the Filartiga case revived the ATS and led 
to a number of decisions in the Second Circuit and in other circuits 
that further developed ATS jurisprudence.41  In particular, courts 
began to explore the “scope and contours of the ATS” in often hotly 
debated and conflicting majority, concurring, and dissenting 
opinions.42  Intense disagreement over the interpretation of the ATS 
and its applicability in various situations led to a huge divergence 
between the circuits and a renewed call for clarification from the 
Supreme Court.43 
But clarify it did not.  In an opinion by Justice Souter in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that the ATS is a purely 
jurisdictional statute and does not provide a separate cause of 
action.44  Thus, the Court held that the ATS could be used to 
establish jurisdiction in a case—but the violation itself must come 
from the law of nations.45  The defendant in Sosa was a Mexican 
national and doctor named Alvarez who was indicted in the United 
States for the torture and murder of an agent of the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration in Mexico.46  The United States hired 
Mexican nationals, including Sosa, to abduct Alvarez in Mexico and 
bring him to the United States where he was subsequently tried and 
acquitted.47  Upon returning to Mexico, Alvarez brought a claim 
 
 39  Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884. 
 40  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).  
 41  See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, No. 10-1491, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 17, 2011); Abdullahi v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 
(11th Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2005); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 
F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 42  Nicholas C. Thompson, Putting the Cart Back Behind the Horse: The Future of 
Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel, 9 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 
293, 295 (2001); see Frank Cruz-Alvarez & Laura E. Wade, The Second Circuit Correctly 
Interprets the Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1111 
(2011).   
 43  See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 788–89, 796 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (examining the disagreement between Judge Edwards and Judge Bork 
about which claims are recognized under the ATS and customary international law 
and whether the particular claim was subject to the political question doctrine).  
 44  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 698. 
 47  Id. 
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under the ATS alleging, inter alia, that Sosa had tortured him in 
violation of the law of nations.48  The district and circuit courts held 
that the ATS created a cause of action for the alleged violation of the 
law of nations.49  The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the lower 
courts erred in reading the ATS to create a separate cause of action 
for a violation of the law of nations.50  Instead, the Court held that the 
ATS is a purely jurisdictional statute.51  As such, an action “under” the 
ATS merely means that a court has jurisdiction to hear a case—a case 
it would not have jurisdiction to hear otherwise—by virtue of the 
ATS.52  The substance of a claim must be recognized by the law of 
nations.53 
The Supreme Court limited the ATS’s jurisdictional breadth by 
stating that “at the time of the enactment[,] the jurisdiction enabled 
federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the 
law of nations and recognized at common law.”54  Thus, “Congress 
intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of 
actions alleging violations of the law of nations”—which, at least in 
1789, would have been incorporated into federal common law.55  This 
law would have encompassed the “general norms governing the 
behavior of national states with each other” and “a body of judge-
made law regulating the conduct of individuals situated outside 
domestic boundaries.”56  These general norms and practices accepted 
as law by nations are often referred to as customary international 
law.57  Thus, the jurisdictional grant of the ATS would require courts 
to look only to a limited number of claims that the law of nations, or 
international law, recognizes.58  Moreover, the ATS does not specify 
who can be sued, only what claims are recognized.59 
 
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id.  
 55  Id. at 720; see id. at 713; Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 281, 3 U.S. 199, 1 L. Ed. 
568 (1796). 
 56  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720; see id. at 713; Ware, 3 Dall. at 281, 3 U.S. at 199, 1 L. Ed. 
at 568.  
 57  See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 12, at 17 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 
1955). 
 58  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714–15. 
 59  Brief for International Human Rights Organizations and International Law 
Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 
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The Court noted that lower courts could look beyond the scope 
of customary international law at the time Congress passed the ATS 
to determine the scope of the substance of claims, but cautioned that 
these courts must not go too far.60  The Court identified five reasons 
why courts should be careful when recognizing claims under the ATS.  
First, Erie changed prior conceptions of federal common law by 
noting that “there is a general understanding that the law is not so 
much found or discovered as it is either made or created.”61  Second, 
Erie eliminated the conception of federal common law.62  Third, the 
Court advised caution in inferring “intent to provide a private cause 
of action where the statute does not supply one expressly.”63  Fourth, 
the potential implications for U.S. foreign relations in creating new 
causes of action may be high.64  Finally, there is no congressional 
mandate to creatively expand the law of nations.65  As a result, 
violations of international law under the ATS are inherently limited.66 
The Court recognized that a claim brought under the 
international law—or the law of nations—must be sufficiently defined 
and substantive to be adjudicated in the federal courts.67  Justice 
Souter then added the now infamous footnote twenty.  In full, the 
footnote states: “A related consideration is whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a 
corporation or individual.”68  The footnote, which was added as an 
attempt to explain, has only created more confusion and is cited by 
courts to both support and reject corporate liability under the ATS.69 
 
182 L. Ed. 2d 270 (No. 10-1491), at 22, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/. 
 60  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (noting that “federal courts should not recognize private 
claims under the federal common law for violations of any international law norm 
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical 
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted”); see U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).   
 61  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 62  Id. at 726. 
 63  Id. at 727. 
 64  Id.  
 65  Id. at 728. 
 66  See id. 
 67  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33 (“[T]he determination whether a norm is sufficiently 
definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an 
element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause of 
action available to litigants in the federal courts.”). 
 68  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20.   
 69  Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see 
generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
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If Sosa cleared up the jurisdictional issue, the ambiguous 
language of footnote twenty in Sosa created more overall confusion.70  
In particular, courts have fought over the scope of the ATS, both in 
terms of what causes of action are recognized under the law of 
nations and the ATS, and who can be sued under the ATS.71  The 
Supreme Court failed to answer these questions in Sosa, leaving the 
door wide open for other interpretive cases.72  In deciding such cases, 
other courts have had to address whether corporations can be held 
liable under the ATS.73 
In the years following Sosa, there was little agreement over the 
scope and breadth of the ATS.74  In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second 
Circuit held that state action is not necessarily required for a finding 
of a violation of customary international law, and thus private actors 
may be liable under the ATS.75  Applying this standard in Khulumani 
v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., the Second Circuit agreed that aiding 
and abetting is a cognizable claim under the law of nations and the 
ATS, but was split as to whether the Kadic holding extended only to 
private individuals or all private actors including corporations.76  
Because the parties themselves in Khulumani did not raise the issue of 
corporate liability under the ATS, and because there was no 
 
granted, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 17, 2011); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 
(2d Cir. 2009); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Khulumani v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Kadic v. Karadzic, 
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 70  See, e.g., Doe VIII, 654 F.3d 11; Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111; Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163; 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d 244; Romero, 552 F.3d 1303; Khulumani, 504 F.3d 
254; Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.   
 71  See generally, sources cited supra note 6. 
 72  See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33, 733 n.20. 
 73  See, e.g., Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 50–55; Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128–31.   
 74  See, e.g., Doe VIII, 654 F.3d 11; Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111; Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163; 
Talisman, 582 F.3d 244; Romero, 552 F.3d 1303; Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254; Kadic, 70 
F.3d 232.   
 75  Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (holding that “certain forms of conduct violate the laws 
of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only 
as private individuals.”). 
 76  Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260.  Judge Katzmann noted that the court had 
“repeatedly treated the issue of whether corporations may be held liable under the 
[ATS] as indistinguishable from the question of whether private individuals may be.”  
Id. at 282 (Katzmann, J., concurring).  Judge Hall agreed that “private parties and 
corporate actors are subject to liability under the [ATS].”  Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 289 
(Hall, J., concurring).  Finally, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Korman argued that 
international law and norms do not recognize corporate liability and as a result, 
corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS.  Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 326 
(Korman, J., dissenting).   
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agreement over whether corporations could be sued under the ATS, 
the Khulumani decision left the door open for future resolution of 
the issue.77 
The Second Circuit was able to avoid the ultimate question of 
corporate liability until Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum in 2010.78  In 
Kiobel, plaintiffs—residents of Nigeria—claimed that various 
corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in 
committing human-rights abuses in violation of the law of nations, 
using the ATS as a vehicle to get into U.S. courts.79  Specifically, 
plaintiffs alleged that corporate defendants aided the Nigerian 
government in killing, “beating, raping, and arresting residents and 
destroying property.”80  In addressing the threshold question of 
whether the corporate defendants could be sued, the Second Circuit 
first held that the Supreme Court’s Sosa opinion and footnote twenty 
required lower courts to determine who can be sued under the ATS 
by examining international law.81  Second, the Second Circuit held 
that customary international law does not recognize—indeed flatly 
rejects—corporate liability as a norm.82  Thus, the court held that 
 
 77  See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260–61. 
 78  The Second Circuit declined to answer the question in an earlier case.  See 
Talisman, 582 F.3d at 244.  There, in making its determination that international law 
under the ATS recognized aiding and abetting liability, but that such liability 
required a purposeful mens rea, the court assumed, without deciding, that 
corporations may be held liable under the ATS.  Id. at 261 n.12.  The court found 
that because the plaintiffs’ claims failed to meet the mens rea requirement of 
purpose it need not decide “‘whether international law extends the scope of liability’ 
to corporations.”  Id. (quoting Sosa, 524 U.S. at 732 n.20). 
 79  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117. 
 80  Id. at 123 (“Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants, inter alia, (1) 
provided transportation to Nigerian forces, (2) allowed their property to be utilized 
as a staging ground for attacks, (3) provided food for soldiers involved in the attacks, 
and (4) provided compensation to those soldiers.”).  
 81  Id. at 127.  The Second Circuit noted that the language of Sosa clearly 
mandates analyzing the scope of liability under the ATS by examining international 
law.  “That language requires that we look to international law to determine our 
jurisdiction over ATS claims against a particular class of defendant, such as 
corporations.”  Id.  Furthermore, “‘the norm [of international law] must extend 
liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue.’”  Id. at 
128 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring)).   
 82  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 134.  To determine whether international law recognizes 
corporate liability, the court surveyed the following: international conventions, 
international custom, general principles of law, and judicial and scholarly opinions.  
Id. at 132.  Specifically, the court addressed international tribunals such as 
Nuremberg and its progeny and determined that these tribunals recognized 
individual liability but expressly denied corporate liability.  Id. at 135; see The 
Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D at 110; 7 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (The Farben Case) 11–60 
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plaintiffs’ claims could not proceed.83 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Leval agreed that plaintiffs’ 
claims must fail because under aiding-and-abetting liability, plaintiffs 
must prove that the defendants acted with purpose to commit the 
underlying crime.84  He would have found, however, that 
corporations are liable under the ATS.85  Judge Leval did not dispute 
the majority’s holding that international law governs the question of 
who can be held liable under the ATS, but objected to the majority’s 
opinion that international law does not allow corporations to be 
sued.86  Judge Leval posited that international law is inconclusive on 
the question of whether corporations may be sued and thus the court 
should have looked to domestic law to answer the question.87  These 
conclusions have paved the way for other circuit courts to address the 
issue of corporate liability and the ATS,88 most recently in Doe VIII. 
III. THE DOE VIII CASE 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Doe VIII came after years of 
litigation and seven previous Doe decisions.89  Doe VIII is one of the 
latest circuit decisions to join the majority of decisions holding that 
corporations can be held liable under the ATS.  Its decision stands in 
stark contrast to the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel.90  In short, 
 
(1952).  The court noted that a proposal to hold corporations liable under the 
International Criminal Court was flatly rejected.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136. 
 83  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145. 
 84  Id. at 154 (Leval, J., concurring).   
 85  Id. at 152–53. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id.  Judge Leval found that international law is inconclusive because the 
majority relies only on international criminal law and not civil law: “Because 
international law generally leaves all aspects of the issue of civil liability to individual 
nations, there is no rule or custom of international law to award damages in any form 
or context, either as to persons or as to juridical ones.”  Id. 
 88  Other courts to consider the ATS and corporate liability include the Eleventh 
Circuit in Romero v. Drummond, Ltd., 552 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that “[t]he text of the [ATS] provides no express exception for 
corporations . . . and the law of this Circuit is that this statute grants jurisdiction from 
complaints of torture against corporate defendants”), the Central District of 
California in Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (assuming that 
corporations can be held liable under the ATS), and the Seventh Circuit in Flomo v. 
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (refusing to decide the 
issue). 
 89  See Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005); Doe VII v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2009); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 14–17 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 90  Compare Doe VIII, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), with Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111 (2d 
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the D.C. Circuit held that U.S. law governs the question of who can 
be sued under the ATS. 
A. Facts 
The D.C. Circuit in Doe VIII tackled the same issues that the 
Second Circuit addressed in Kiobel.  In Doe VIII, plaintiffs—villagers in 
Aceh, Indonesia—contended that they were tortured and injured by 
Exxon Mobil security forces hired in accordance with an Indonesian 
government contract.91  Eleven of the fifteen plaintiffs filed claims 
alleging that Exxon’s security forces “committed murder, torture, 
sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment in violation of the 
(ATS) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), and various 
common-law torts.”92  The other four plaintiffs asserted claims in 
violation of common-law torts.93  The district court dismissed the 
claims under the ATS and the TVPA, but proceeded with the 
common-law claims, which were eventually dismissed.94  In the D.C. 
Circuit, plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims, and 
defendant cross-appealed, raising for the first time its contention that 
corporations are not liable under the ATS.95 
B.  Majority Opinion 
The majority held that Exxon Mobil could be held liable for 
violations of customary international law under the ATS.96  In doing 
so, the D.C. Circuit explained that U.S law—not international law—
governs the question of who can be sued in a case where jurisdiction 
is obtained through the ATS.97  Even under international law, 
corporations would still be held liable.98  At the outset, the D.C. 
Circuit noted that the case was distinguishable from Sosa because Sosa 
dealt with whether a particular claim was recognizable under 
international law and derivatively under the ATS, while the Doe VIII 
case deals instead with whether corporations can be sued.99  The issue 
 
Cir. 2009). 
 91  Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 14–15. 
 92  Id. at 15. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005); Doe VII v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2009).   
 95  Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 15.  
 96  Id. at 15. 
 97  Id. at 57. 
 98  Id. at 51–55. 
 99  Id. at 41. 
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in Sosa was whether the alleged arrest and torture could support a 
cause of action, and thus the court looked to customary international 
law.100  As Sosa made clear, international law determines which causes 
of action plaintiffs can assert using the ATS.101  But the Sosa Court did 
not address the scope of who can be sued for these violations of 
international law.102  Doe VIII, however, dealt with who would be made 
to pay for the alleged wrong.103  The court turned to an example to 
illustrate this point: “in legal parlance one does not refer to the tort 
of ‘corporate battery’ as a cause of action.  The cause of action is 
battery; agency law determines whether a principal will pay damages 
for the battery committed by the principal’s agent.”104  Thus, the 
proper question here is “whether a corporation can be made to pay 
damages for the conduct of its agents in violation of the law of 
nations.”105  While customary international law may provide the basis 
for determining whether disapproval attaches to certain conduct, 
international law does not provide all of the procedural and 
underlying law necessary for making a determination under the 
ATS.106  Thus, courts must look to federal common law for an answer 
to the question of who can be sued under the ATS. 
The majority in Doe VIII recognized that both the majority and 
minority in Kiobel misread footnote twenty of Sosa.107  The Doe VIII 
majority maintains that all private actors—both persons and 
corporations—are treated the same for purposes of the ATS.108  The 
Doe VIII majority held that the purpose of footnote twenty is to 
question the distinction between all private actors and public actors, 
not between private actors.109  As a result, the court must look to 
 
 100  Id. 
 101  Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. at 41. 
 106  Id. at 49. 
 107  See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 50–52. 
 108  Id. at 49. 
 109  Id. at 51. 
If the violated norm is one that international law applies only against states, then “a 
private actor [] such as a corporations or an individual,” who acts independently of a 
State can have no liability for a violation of the law of nations because there has been 
no violation of the law of nations.  On the other hand, if the conduct is of the type 
classified as a violation of the norms of international law regardless of whether done 
by a State or private actor, then “a private [] such as a corporation or an individual,” has 
violated the law of nations and is subject to liability in a suit under the ATS. 
Id. (citing Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 166 (Leval, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)). 
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domestic law to determine which private actors can be sued. 
Having dispensed with the choice-of-law question, the issue of 
whether domestic law recognizes corporate liability was an easy one 
for the D.C. Circuit to address.110  According to that court, corporate 
liability has been recognized in the United States for centuries.111  In 
addition, the D.C. Circuit found that even the Founders had a 
conception of corporate liability at the time that Congress enacted 
the ATS.112  As a result, it held that corporations are not immune 
from liability under the ATS and can be held liable for violations of 
customary international law giving rise to a specific cause of action.113 
Finally, the court found that even assuming, arguendo, that 
international law governs, Exxon Mobil is still liable because 
international law recognizes corporate civil liability.114  The Kiobel 
court’s examples of the absence of corporate liability in international 
law are misplaced because all of those examples deal exclusively with 
criminal liability, not civil liability.115  Indeed, history provides 
persuasive support for the proposition that corporations can be held 
civilly liable.116  The majority in Doe VIII states that Kiobel’s focus on 
the Nuremberg Trials and the Tribunal’s dismissal of I.G. Farben 
Corporation is also misplaced because that decision had less to do 
with whether international law recognizes corporate liability than 
with the specific circumstances of post-war Germany’s economic 
situation.117  As a result, the majority stated that even if international 
law governs the corporate liability inquiry, there are ample sources of 
international law that recognize corporate liability.118 
 
 110  Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 47. 
 111  Id.  
 112  Id.  In arguing that corporate liability has been recognized for centuries, 
international law scholars cite to the suit against the East India Company in the late 
seventeenth century in which the Company was sued for “its agent’s torts in violation 
of the law of nations.”  Brief for Professors of Legal History William R. Casto, et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners’ Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., cert. granted, No. 10-1491, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 17, 2011), 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-
petroleum/.  
 113  Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 57. 
 114  Id. at 51–52. 
 115  Id.  
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. 
 118  See id. at 57–64.  The D.C. Circuit also addressed a number of other important 
issues in its opinion in Doe VIII, including extraterritoriality, the interplay between 
the ATS and TVPA and the appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and abetting 
liability.  Id. at 20–28, 57–64. 
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C.  Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in Doe VIII is important because it 
provides the basis for the argument that corporations cannot be sued 
under the ATS, which is similar to the reasoning that the Second 
Circuit used in Kiobel.119  First, Judge Kavanaugh would have held that 
under the presumption against extraterritoriality, the ATS does not 
apply to torts committed in foreign countries, but rather only to 
actions by aliens for conduct that occurred inside the United States.120  
Second, Judge Kavanaugh would have applied customary 
international law and determined that corporate liability does not 
exist under recognized international law.121  Third, Judge Kavanaugh 
would have barred corporate liability because of its inconsistency with 
the TVPA, which provides that an action may only be sustained 
against “persons.”122  Finally, Judge Kavanaugh would have applied 
the political question doctrine and consequently found that it was 
contrary to U.S. foreign policy to hold corporations liable under the 
ATS.123  While the reasons set forth by Judge Kavanaugh do make 
some sense, they are contrary to U.S. law, ATS jurisprudence, and 
public policy.124 
IV. CORPORATIONS SHOULD BE LIABLE UNDER THE ATS: WHY THE D.C. 
CIRCUIT CORRECTLY DECIDED DOE VIII 
The majority in Doe VIII correctly held that corporations can be 
liable under the ATS.  In so holding, the court properly applied 
domestic law rather than international law to address the question of 
who can be sued when jurisdiction is obtained by the ATS.  There are 
seven reasons why Doe VIII was correctly decided.  First, Sosa’s 
footnote twenty and other ATS jurisprudence require courts to look 
at domestic law, not international law.125  In other words, 
international law provides only the cause of action and its elements 
while other questions related to deciding the case, such as 
jurisdictional issues, are left to domestic law.  Second, holding that 
individuals—but not corporations—can be liable under the ATS is 
 
 119  See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 81–85. 
 120  Id. at 72 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 121  Id. at 72–73.  
 122  Id. at 73.  
 123  Id.  
 124  See infra Part IV. 
 125  See infra Part IV.A. 
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major conceptual flaw.126  Third, holding corporations liable is 
consistent with the purpose of the ATS.127  Fourth, the implications of 
a contrary holding are squarely U.S. against policy.128  Fifth, it does 
not make sense to look at international law to determine who can be 
a defendant because international law does not provide rules for 
decision-making.129  Sixth, the Doe VIII court was also correct in 
holding that, even assuming international law governs, corporations 
would still be liable.130  Finally, corporate liability under the ATS is 
consistent with international human-rights norms and principles of 
corporate responsibility.131 
A.  Sosa Requires Courts to Look at Domestic Law 
The Doe VIII majority was correct that the ATS itself and footnote 
twenty of Sosa require courts to look not at international law but at 
federal law to determine whether corporations can be sued under the 
ATS.  The text of the ATS does not limit who can be a defendant, but 
rather, only who can be a plaintiff.132  The Supreme Court endorsed 
this understanding of the ATS in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess 
Shipping Corp., where it recognized that “[t]he [ATS] by its terms does 
not distinguish among classes of defendants . . . .”133  Thus, Congress 
in no way expressly limited the class of defendants to which the 
Statute could extend.134  From a statutory construction standpoint, 
there is no reason to believe that Congress intended the ATS to limit 
a class of defendants.135 
 
 126  See infra Part IV.B. 
 127  See infra Part IV.C. 
 128  See infra Part IV.D. 
 129  See infra Part IV.E. 
 130  See infra Part IV.F. 
 131  See infra Part IV.G. 
 132  28 U.S.C § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction in 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”); see Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 
F.3d 11, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th 
Cir. 2008).   
 133  Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 
(1989). 
 134  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Shell (No. 10-1491), at 22, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/.  
 135  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Ress. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984).  Even assuming that Congress did not expressly answer the questions of 
who can be a defendant, the Supreme Court requires only that a construction of the 
statute be “permissible.”  Id.   
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Furthermore, Doe VIII is correct in pointing out that corporate 
liability is consistent with footnote twenty of Sosa—the only guidance 
from the Supreme Court on the scope of the ATS.136  The Kiobel 
majority misconstrued and misunderstood footnote twenty by 
assuming that the footnote requires both the violation and the 
violator of a customary international law norm to be recognized by 
international law.137  Footnote twenty stands for the proposition—and 
supports the common understanding—that some parts of 
international law apply only to states, and thus plaintiffs can assert 
these claims only against the states themselves.138  Thus, footnote 
twenty rightly concludes that once a court determines that a claim is 
cognizable under international law, the court must then determine 
whether that claim can be applied to states or private actors by 
looking to international law.139  International law answers the 
question of what norms apply to states, and what norms apply to 
everyone else.  The Sosa Court was discussing whether international 
law permits only states to be sued or whether private actors could also 
be sued, not whether international law governs an inquiry into which 
private actors could be sued.140  Moreover, the footnote makes no 
 
 136  Brief for the United States, supra note 134, at 18 (arguing that “the court of 
appeals misread footnote 20 to require not just an international consensus regarding 
the content of an international-law norm, but also an international consensus on 
how to enforce a violation of that norm.”). 
 137  See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41; David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of 
CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute and the 
Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334, 364 
(2011).   
 138  See Brief for the United States, supra note 134, at 17 (“From Sosa’s footnote 20, 
it is clear that ‘if the defendant is a private actor,’ . . . a court must consider whether 
private actors are capable of violating the international-law norm at issue. . . .  The 
distinction between norms that apply only to state actors and norms that also apply to 
non-state actors is well established in customary international law.”) (internal 
citations omitted); see also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 3–
4 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining that “[t]he law is no stranger to the idea of holding 
individuals responsible for egregious conduct toward their fellow human beings”). 
 139  This was Kadic’s proposition.  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
 140  Brief for Petitioner, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011), at 20, available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/.   
It is wrong to suggest that footnote 20 supplies the answer to any issue 
other than the specific issue this Court was actually addressing.  This is 
especially so given this Court’s clear decision in Sosa that the ATS 
provides subject matter jurisdiction for federal common law causes of 
action for certain universally condemned international human rights 
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distinction between private actors that are individuals and private 
actors that are corporations, nor does it suggest that the two should 
be treated differently.141  There is absolutely no distinction between 
corporations and private persons: all private actors are treated the 
same.  Looking to international law for the cause of action is one 
thing, but determining who is liable for that cause of action is an 
entirely different question.  The former is governed by the ATS’s 
requirement to look to international law; the latter is not.142 
Footnote twenty can be read in still another way: it could simply 
pose the question of “whether international law extends the scope of 
liability” to corporations, or whether some other law achieves that 
function.143  Under this reading, the Court simply poses a question for 
lower courts to address: which law should govern the question of 
whether corporations can be sued?  Thus, the text of the Sosa opinion 
and footnote twenty indicate that courts may to look to domestic law 
to determine whether corporations can be sued under the ATS.144 
B.  Holding Individuals but not Corporations Liable Under the ATS is 
a Major Conceptual Flaw 
No court disputes that private actors are subject to liability.145  
Because corporations are defined as having a corporate personhood, 
they should not be treated any differently from private individuals.146  
In Kadic, the Second Circuit held that international law does not 
confine the reach of the ATS to states and instead expands that reach 
to private persons.147  As the Kadic court states, domestic law is a more 
proper source than international law to answer this question.148  
 
violations.   
Id. at 32. 
 141  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 552 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).  
 142  See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41; Scheffer, supra note 137.  Contra Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 
126. 
 143  See Scheffer supra note 137.  
 144  It should also be noted that footnote twenty of Sosa is only that: a footnote.  
The footnote is only dicta, and courts should take care in not placing too much stock 
in a few words buried within it, especially if its effect is to immunize a large group of 
potential defendants.  See Ben. Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 17 (2003) (stating 
that “[d]icta of course have no precedential value . . . even when they do not 
contradict . . . prior holdings of the Court”). 
 145  See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 2005) (disagreeing with the 
previously held proposition by some courts that “the law of nations, as understood in 
the modern era, confines its reach to state action.”). 
 146  See Scheffer, supra note 137. 
 147  Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. 
 148  See infra Part IV.A. 
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Under American law, corporations are treated as individuals and are 
thus held liable, as would any other natural person.149  Indeed, most 
recently in Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court held that both 
corporations and natural persons are legal persons.150  In essence, the 
Supreme Court set forth a conception of corporate personhood 
permitting corporations to donate money to political campaigns just 
as individuals do.151  Thus, if we recognize—indeed agree—that 
private individuals can be held liable for violations of the law of 
nations under the ATS and that, according to Citizens United, 
corporations are to be treated as individuals, then it seems to follow 
that corporations should be liable under the ATS.152  The Supreme 
Court should be consistent in its application of corporate 
personhood outlined in Citizens United and hold that corporations 
can be sued under the ATS. 
C.  Holding Corporations Liable is Consistent with the Purpose of the 
ATS. 
Courts should recognize corporate liability under the ATS 
because it was a principle of both U.S. (domestic) and international 
law at the time Congress passed the ATS and because corporate 
liability furthers the original purpose of the ATS.  When Congress 
passed the ATS, corporate liability was well-established and 
recognized not only in the United States but also internationally—
especially in British common law.153  Specifically, corporations such as 
the East India Company were sued and found liable for the actions of 
their agents in international law disputes.154  Furthermore, ship 
commanders sailing on the high seas were held liable for the acts of 
their sailors.155  With the emergence of such principles, the United 
 
 149  See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010).  
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  See generally Cheryl Holzmeyer, Human Rights in an Era of Neoliberal 
Globalization: The Alien Tort Claims Act and Grassroots Mobilization in Doe v. Unocal, 43 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 271 (2009).  
 153  Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 654 F.3d 11, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that 
“[t]he notion that corporations could be held liable for their torts, therefore, would 
not have been surprising to the First Congress that enacted the ATS”); see Hotchkis v. 
Royal Bank of Scot., (1797) 2 Eng. Rep. 1202, 1203 (H.L.). 
 154  Brief for Professors of Legal History, supra note 112, at 16; see Moodalay v. The 
E. India Co., (1785) 28 Eng. Rep. 1245, 1246 (Ch.) (stating that “[a]t the outset I 
thought the cases of a corporation and of an individual were different; but I am glad 
to have the authority of Lord Talbot, that they are not.”). 
 155  Brief for Professors of Legal History, supra note 112, at 23; see, e.g., The Malek 
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States’s domestic common law adopted corporate liability.156  These 
examples demonstrate that corporate liability and agency law were 
defined principles of domestic and international law when Congress 
passed the ATS.  Because corporate liability existed, the Founders 
decided not to explicitly exempt corporations from liability—
otherwise they would certainly have done so in the statute.157  Thus, it 
is well within the scope of the original statutory purpose to hold 
corporations liable under the ATS.158 
Furthermore, corporate liability promotes the original purpose 
of the ATS, “to forestall the appearance of American complicity in 
violations of the law of nations.”159  Thus, Congress developed the 
ATS to give the United States legitimacy in the international realm.160  
The ATS provided a means to show the world that the United States 
could deal effectively with international issues.  Today, the ATS can 
and should be a mechanism through which the United States 
demonstrates that it will not be complicit in violations of the law of 
nations—namely, human-rights abuses by corporations.161  Holding 
corporations liable under the ATS is thus consistent with the original 
purpose of the ATS. 
D.  The Implications of a Contrary Holding are Squarely Against 
Public Policy. 
In Sosa, the Supreme Court mandated that courts look to public 
policy when considering the scope of the ATS.162  When examining 
public policy, the Supreme Court’s decision counsels in favor of 
examining both the negative and positive consequences of 
recognizing a claim.163  In terms of corporate liability, it is clear that 
the positive consequences of allowing corporations to be sued under 
 
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233–34 (1844); The Mariana Flora 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 
1, 40–41 (1826). 
 156  Brief for Professors of Legal History, supra note 112, at 29–31. 
 157  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 140, at 29. 
 158  Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 48. 
 159  Brief for Professors of Legal History, supra note 112. 
 160  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716–17 (2004). 
 161  Compare Brief for Petitioner, supra note 140, at 28, with Brief for Respondent, 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., cert. granted, 
2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522. 
 162  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33 (“[T]he determination whether a norm is sufficiently 
definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an 
element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause 
available to litigants in federal courts.”). 
 163  Id. 
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the ATS outweigh the negative consequences of holding corporations 
liable. 
Holding that corporations can be liable for violations of the law 
of nations is different than holding that corporations will be liable.164  
Allowing plaintiffs to sue corporations under the ATS simply allows 
plaintiffs to bring the suit—it does not make corporations 
automatically liable.  A corporation will only be required to pay 
damages if a court finds that it violated international law, which is by 
no means guaranteed.  The law should not permit corporations to get 
away with violations of international law simply because they choose 
to form a corporation.165  In fact, one of the primary purposes of 
forming a corporation is to avoid individual liability in favor of entity 
liability.  The law should not limit liability for the sole reason that 
corporations would prefer to not pay damage awards.  The United 
States should not limit liability for a wrong simply because the alleged 
wrongdoers—corporations, or any party for that matter—do not like 
the possibility that they will be hailed into court. Wrongful conduct is 
wrong regardless of the identity of the perpetrator.  Addressing 
wrongdoing is precisely the purpose of statutes such as the ATS.  To 
then retract that liability because it will be unfavorable for some of 
the wrongdoers would defeat the entire purpose of the statute. 
Holding that corporations can be sued under the ATS allows 
domestic law to guide the behavior of corporations overseas.166  
Congress has expressly allowed for such extraterritorial control over 
U.S. citizens abroad.167  This oversight is desirable because absent the 
extension of U.S. law to corporate entities abroad, corporations 
would be able to get away with human-rights abuses that were either 
unenforced or unrecognized under the laws of the country in which 
the corporations were operating.168  Barring ATS litigation, 
corporations would be left only to the laws of the nations in which 
 
 164  Infra Part IV. 
 165  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 149–50 (2d Cir. 
2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (stating that according to the majority-created rule “one 
who earns profits by commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights 
can successfully shield those profits from victim’s claims for compensation simply by 
taking the precaution of conducting the heinous operations in the corporate form”); 
Khulumani v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 504 F.3d 254, 289 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., 
concurring).  
 166  See Holzmeyer, supra note 152. 
 167  Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Congress in 
prescribing standards of conduct for American citizens may protect the impact of its 
laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States . . . .”). 
 168  See Holzmeyer, supra note 152. 
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they operate.169  The courts of these nations are oftentimes 
susceptible to corruption and inaccessible to ordinary individuals.170  
Simply stated, just because a corporation must transact business does 
not mean that it has a “license to assist in violations of international 
law.”171  It is illogical to allow corporations to receive special treatment 
simply because they are corporations, and prevent them from 
answering to offenses that they or their agents commit abroad. 
While some scholars argue that the individual managers of a 
corporation would still be liable even absent recognition of corporate 
liability under the ATS, this argument is misdirected.172  In reality, 
liability of the corporations themselves is a more effective deterrent 
because “corporate agents are judgment-proof and cannot bear the 
costs of sanctions, and because corporate liability encourages 
shareholders to monitor corporate activities.”173  Disallowing 
corporate liability is contrary to established U.S. agency law, which 
allows entities to be held liable for the acts of their agents.  The 
purpose of damages in a tort is to make the plaintiff whole.174  
Holding only managers liable under the ATS for decisions the entity 
makes as a whole would permit corporations to evade responsibility 
and would prevent the application of agency law—a reason for 
forming corporations in the first place.175  Courts should afford 
plaintiffs complete redressability in their claims, and plaintiffs should 
be allowed to seek that redress from the entity that harmed them.  
Under U.S. agency principles, plaintiffs may sue those individuals or 
entities that can best compensate the plaintiff in order to make him 
or her whole.  Plaintiffs under the ATS should be afforded the same 
opportunity. 
Preventing corporations from being sued under the ATS is 
inconsistent with modern conceptions of justice.  First, a rule that 
corporations cannot be sued under the ATS would be categorical, 
therefore applying to all ATS cases in which a corporation is a 
 
 169  See id. 
 170  Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 289 (Hall, J., concurring). 
 171  Id. 
 172  See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120; see also Janine Stanisz, The Expansion of Limited 
Liability Protection in the Corporate Form: The Aftermath of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 573, 598 (2011); Thompson, supra 
note 42. 
 173  Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 
111 YALE L.J. 443, 473 (2001). 
 174  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979). 
 175  See generally Stanisz, supra note 172, at 598. 
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potential defendant.176  Such a rule would prevent any corporation 
from ever being sued under the ATS.  A categorical rule that 
disallows a suit completely is unfounded.  It essentially allows 
corporations to commit human-rights abuses or ignore potential 
abuses because they are immunized from liability in the United 
States.177  Natural persons who commit human-rights abuses are 
subject to liability, while corporations, composed of natural persons 
shielded by the corporate structure, are not.  This reality produces an 
inequitable result, as among ATS defendants.  Second, holding that 
corporations cannot be sued is inconsistent with domestic and 
international norms that require courts to provide plaintiffs with a 
meaningful remedy.178  Preventing corporations from being sued 
under the ATS effectively limits a plaintiff’s ability to obtain redress 
for his or her injuries.  Thus, plaintiffs would only be able to obtain a 
judgment against an individual, which in turn would likely 
substantially reduce or inhibit a damages award.179 
Holding that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS is also 
inconsistent with current jurisprudence because it is inconsistent with 
Filartiga.180  In determining that corporations cannot be sued under 
the ATS, the Kiobel court explained that for liability to attach to an 
ATS claim, there must be a violation of international law that is 
universally recognized.181  This is a misunderstanding of ATS 
jurisprudence.  If courts must look to universal international law as 
Kiobel states, then ATS plaintiffs would always have to demonstrate 
that the defendants would be universally held liable under 
international law.182  Thus, the Filartiga plaintiffs would have had to 
 
 176  Brief for the United States, supra note 134, at 14.   
 177  Of course, a corporation may be liable for human-rights abuses in the states in 
which they occur.  Many of these states, however, are severely lax in enforcing 
human-rights norms; some states do not even have legal systems that recognize such 
rights.   
 178  Cf. Brief for the United States, supra note 134, at 24.   
 179  See Ratner, supra note 173, at 473. 
 180  See generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 181  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010).   
 182  Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 15, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell (No. 10-1491), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_ 
preview/briefs/10-1491_petitioner_amcu_law_scholars.authcheckdam.pdf; see Brief 
for Navi Pillay, The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners (No. 10-1491), at 6, available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/ 
(“[T]he proposition that corporations are not accountable for violations of 
international human rights law ignores a fundamental principle of international law: 
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“demonstrate that torturers were universally held civilly liable in the 
courts of [all] third countries.”183  This threshold is too high and 
would alter years of ATS jurisprudence.  It is inconsistent with the 
development of current domestic and international law and would 
essentially render hundreds of previous decisions bad law.184  The 
much more reasoned approach to analyzing corporate liability under 
the ATS is found in domestic, not international law. 
There is a strong policy rationale for clearly defining the 
standard for corporate liability under the ATS.185  Currently, 
corporations are held to different standards in different circuits.186  
Accordingly, the lack of clarity “has thrown the circuit[s] into 
disarray.”187  Clearly defining the standard of liability would put 
corporations, individuals, and foreign nations on notice of the 
expectations and responsibilities of corporations engaging in activity 
abroad.  Absent a universal norm, there is too much uncertainty on 
the part of both corporations and plaintiffs seeking to bring claims.188  
In addition, a clear definition would eliminate confusion and 
ambiguities on the standard, and therefore allow corporations a 
degree of comfort in knowing precisely what is expected of them and 
to what extent they can be held liable.189  If corporate liability is 
recognized across the board, corporations and plaintiffs can move 
forward in addressing the necessary issues.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
should address the issue and in doing so should clearly outline that 
corporations can be sued under the ATS.190 
 
the principle that victims of human rights violations are entitled to an effective 
remedy.”).   
 183  Brief for The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra 
note 182, at 15. 
 184  Circuit decisions permitting corporate liability under the ATS that would be 
overturned by such a Supreme Court case include Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
654 F.3d 11 and Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).   
 185  Telephone Interview with Alka Pradhan, Counsel, The Constitution Project 
(Oct. 20, 2011) (on file with author). 
 186  Compare Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 187  Mark Hamblett, Circuit Rejects Corporate Alien Tort Law Liability, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 
20, 2010. 
 188  Telephone Interview with Alka Pradhan, supra note 185. 
 189  Karen M. Borg & Merkys I. Gómez, Alien Tort Statute: Should We Be Concerned?, 
CORPORATE COUNSEL 2 (Aug. 2007), available at 
http://butlerrubin.com/web/br.nsf/0/CF4E3FBB296096518625732A005AE4CA/$F
ILE/W0052343.PDF.  
 190  Telephone Interview with Alka Pradhan, supra note 185; contra Michael 
Garvey, Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Legislative 
Prerogative, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 381, 396 (arguing that the legislature is best 
JACEK.DOX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:27 PM 
2013] COMMENT 297 
 
E.  International Law Does Not Provide Rules of Decision-Making and 
Thus Courts Must Look to Domestic Law 
Conceptually, it makes sense to look to domestic federal law to 
determine whether corporations can be held liable for a violation of 
the law of nations because domestic law provides rules of decision-
making.  Sosa was consistent with the proposition that “the cause of 
action in ATS cases is based on federal common law and that 
international law leaves the means by which international law 
obligations are to be implemented within States to each domestic 
legal system.”191  International law allows nations to decide for 
themselves how they will implement international law norms.192  The 
idea that courts should look to domestic law to determine the claims 
recognizable under the ATS for the scope of those claims is 
consistent with international law.193 Indeed, international law requires 
courts applying international law to look to domestic law for 
procedural and decision-making rules.194  In other words, the ATS is a 
grant of jurisdiction in federal courts to aliens bringing a claim of a 
violation of the law of nations.195  The law of nations formally 
indicates the wrongs that the community of nations recognizes, and 
the ATS makes those wrongs actionable in U.S. courts—it should not 
matter whether a corporation or an individual commits that wrong.196  
Thus, looking to domestic law to determine who can be sued allows 
those who have been injured by corporations the recourse they would 
receive had the injury been committed by an individual. 
 
equipped to answer the question of corporate liability).  To the contrary, courts are 
well-equipped to answer these questions and indeed should answer the questions, 
especially when they have posed the questions.  
 191  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 140, at 23. 
 192  The Lotus Case, 1927 P.I.C.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 1927); see Brief for 
International Law Scholars, supra note 182, at 5. 
 193  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 152, 183–84 (2d Cir. 
2010) (Leval, J., concurring); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 770, 
778 (2d Cir. 1980) (Edwards, J., concurring); Brief for Professors of Legal History, 
supra note 112, at 3 (stating “[a] historical understanding of the legal system 
demonstrates that the norms that defined prohibited conduct under the ATS were 
drawn from the law of nations while enforcement questions, such as which particular 
defendant would be assessed damages, were drawn from the domestic common 
law”). 
 194  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 140, at 34 (stating that “[t]he drafters of the 
ATS understood that the rules of decision in ATS cases would be found in common 
law”); see The Lotus Case, 1927 P.I.C.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 28; see Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730–31 (2004); Brief for International Law Scholars, supra 
note 182, at 5. 
 195  See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (citing historical proof). 
 196  See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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In addition, international law does not provide rules with 
sufficient clarity for determining all aspects of a violation of 
international law.197  While the claim itself may be universally and 
specifically recognized as a violation of international law, the other 
rules involving such a claim—such as its scope and limits—may not 
be recognized with the same specificity and universality.  This reality 
does not mean that all claims arising under international law lack 
sufficient definiteness—it simply means that courts must look 
elsewhere to determine the contours of its scope.198  U.S. law 
adequately—in fact, exceptionally—determines the scope of claims 
that international law recognizes.199  International law does not have 
the standards and procedural mechanisms necessary to guide such a 
decision.200 
To determine what claims are recognized by the law of nations, 
and what the elements of those claims are, we must look to 
international law.201  There, the inquiry under international law ends, 
and courts should return to domestic law to determine the rest of the 
case.202  Doe VIII illustrates this proposition by noting that courts do 
not conceptualize a separate claim for “corporate battery.”203  Instead, 
the claim is always simply battery, and who pays damages is left to 
common law agency principles.204  In other words, the question in this 
hypothetical and in the ATS choice-of-law question is, more 
appropriately, “who must pay damages?”205 
 
 197  See Michael Barsa & David Dana, Three Obstacles of the Promotion of Corporate 
Social Responsibility by Means of the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Sosa Court’s Incoherent 
Conception of the Law of Nations, the “Purposive” Action Requirement for Aiding and 
Abetting, and the State Action Requirement for Primary Liability, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REV. 79, 99–100 (2010) (arguing that “while the Supreme Court in Sosa 
acknowledged that customary international law might evolve over time, it tried to 
anchor that evolution in a false sense of the ‘certainty’ of the ‘law of nations’ as it 
had been recognized under the eighteenth century natural law tradition.  Contrary 
to the Court’s assumption, the ‘law of nations’ was meant to be somewhat fluid and 
evolving from the very beginning.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 198  Cf. Barsa & Dana, supra note 197, at 90–91.  
 199  Cf. Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 43.  
 200  See Id. 
 201  Id. at 41. 
 202  Other aspects of the case include procedural determinations and elements 
that international law cannot provide, such as who is a defendant.  These domestic 
law determinations should not be inconsistent with international law.  
 203  Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41.  
 204  See id. 
 205  Id. at 41; see Brief for Professors of Legal History, supra note 112 (“Courts 
historically used domestic law to address questions of allocating losses to juridical 
entities for violations of the law of nations.”). 
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Thus, while there must be a violation of the law of nations to 
trigger the ATS and provide subject matter jurisdiction over the case, 
the federal common law supplies the rules “governing the scope of 
tort remedies and other rules governing ATS litigation.”206  
Furthermore, it makes sense to apply federal domestic law to the 
inquiry because courts already look to federal law in such cases for 
procedural rules of decision-making.207  By its express language, the 
ATS limits who can be a plaintiff and lets federal law—not 
international law—determine who can be a defendant by way of the 
limits of the rules of personal jurisdiction.208 
F.  Even Under International Law, Corporations may Still be Liable 
Despite the fact that Sosa and policy principles mandate that 
courts look to domestic rather than customary international law to 
determine the scope of liability for corporations under the ATS, 
international law positively recognizes corporate liability.209  First, 
customary international law recognizes juridical liability for entities 
such as corporations.210  The International Court of Justice 
adjudicated a case involving a company, and thus implicitly 
acknowledged that corporations can be sued.211  In addition, the 
International Court of Justice held that an international organization 
can sue a state.212  If juridical entities such as international 
organizations can bring a claim, then it seems fair for juridical 
entities like corporations to be sued as well.213  Second, general 
 
 206  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 140, at 34; see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692, 724 (2004). 
 207  See generally Philip A. Scarborough, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising Under the 
Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (2007). 
 208  See generally id. 
 209  See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 53.   
 210  See generally Harmony v. United States (The Malek Adhel), 43 U.S. (2 How.) 
210, 233–34 (1844); The Mariana Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40–41 (1826); 
Moodalay v. The E. India Co., (1785) 28 Eng. Rep. 1245, 1246 (Ch.).  Maritime law, a 
part of international law, recognizes liability for juridical entities such as ships.  Brief 
for International Law Scholars, supra note 182, at 27.  Today, “it is not uncommon 
for the human rights responsibilities of multinational corporations to be addressed 
and applied by intergovernmental organizations.”  Id.   
 211  See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 38–39 (Feb. 5).  
“Corporate personhood has been recognized by the ICJ upon considering the 
‘wealth of practice already accumulated on the subject in municipal law.’”  Doe VIII, 
654 F.3d at 53 (quoting Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. at 38–39). 
 212  See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179–80 (Apr. 11). 
 213  The International Court of Justice recognized that the United Nations had a 
right to bring a claim against a state because of its uniquely international function 
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principles of law—a source of international law214—recognize 
corporate liability.215  All legal systems of the world, including the 
United States, recognize corporate liability.216  In fact, suits against 
corporations are “both commonplace and regularly exercised, 
including for conduct that occurs outside the home jurisdiction of a 
corporation.”217  Thus, general principles of law recognize that 
corporations can be sued.  Third, treaties require the United States to 
uphold human rights.218  Thus, international law requires that the 
United States implement laws and policies in accordance with human 
rights.219  The ATS is one such law, and to be compliant with treaties, 
it must recognize corporate liability to protect human rights. 
Furthermore, the ATS’s grant of jurisdiction over corporations 
operating in foreign countries is consistent with jurisdictional 
principles in international law.  International law recognizes that 
states may obtain jurisdiction over defendants in a number of ways 
without the defendant being present within that state.220  According 
to the passive personality principle, states may obtain jurisdiction over 
defendants when those defendants harm nationals of the state.221  
Similarly, the protective principle recognizes jurisdiction over 
defendants who infringe on an important state interest.222  Finally, the 
universal jurisdiction principle recognizes that jurisdiction is proper 
in some certain instances where the right infringed is universal in 
nature.223  The ATS most properly fits within the protective 
principle.224  If the United States asserts that human rights and 
foreign relations are important state interests, corporations clearly 
damage these important state interests when they fail to abide by 
 
and because it should have a right to remedy a wrong.  See id. at 184–85.  Similarly, 
corporations have a unique international function and character that supersedes 
national boundaries, much like the United Nations.  Thus, plaintiffs, like the United 
Nations, should be able to redress their injuries.   
 214  See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 56–61 (2006). 
 215  Brief for International Law Scholars, supra note 182, at 22.   
 216  Brief for International Law Scholars in Support of the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., cert. granted, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522, 
at 16. 
 217  Id. at 18. 
 218  Id. at 17. 
 219  See id. 
 220  See MCCAFFREY, supra note 214, at 179–88. 
 221  See id. at 188–89. 
 222  See id. at 182–84.  
 223  See id. at 184–88. 
 224  Cf. id. at 188–89. 
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human-rights norms. 
Finally, the Kiobel court erroneously determined that 
international law does not recognize corporate liability based solely 
on looking to criminal, not civil, tribunals.225  In the context of the 
ATS, courts should look to civil liability.226  Indeed, there is an 
enormous difference between criminal liability and civil liability, and 
the legal reasoning for applying one cannot necessarily apply in the 
context of the other.227  Courts and scholars have rejected criminal 
liability of corporations in part because civil liability provides the 
most effective punishment for corporations—monetary damages—
while other punishments—such as imprisonment—are more suitable 
for individuals in the criminal context.228 
The Second Circuit erred when it looked to The Nuremberg Trials 
for direction on the issue of whether international law recognizes 
corporate liability.229  In Kiobel, the Second Circuit examined the 
Nuremberg Court’s dismissal of claims against I.G. Farben, a 
corporate entity that was sued for complicity in the Holocaust, as 
evidence that international law prohibits corporations from being 
sued.230 Furthermore, the Nuremberg court was a criminal tribunal.231  
International law does not recognize corporate criminal liability.232  
Thus, the Nuremberg court did not have jurisdiction over the claims 
against the company for criminal violations.  Despite the fact that the 
Nuremberg court did not exercise jurisdiction over corporations, it 
 
 225  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 170 (Leval, J., concurring only 
in the judgment). 
 226  See id. 
 227  Id.   
Whereas criminal liability of corporations is unknown in much of the 
world, civil liability of corporations is enforced throughout the world.  
Whereas the imposition of criminal punishment on corporations fails 
to achieve the objective of criminal punishment, the compensatory 
purposes of civil liability are perfectly served when it is imposed on 
corporations.  Whereas criminal prosecution of a corporation could 
misdirect prosecutorial attention away from the responsible persons 
who deserve punishment, imposition of civil compensatory liability on 
corporations makes possible the achievement of the goal of civil law to 
compensate victims for the abuses they have suffered. 
Id. 
 228  Id. 
 229  Contra id. at 132–33. 
 230  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 170 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 231  See id. (majority opinion) at 155. 
 232  Brief for The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra 
note 182, at 23. 
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made clear that corporations could be held liable.233  Thus, general 
principles of international law and legal history suggest that 
corporations can be used under international law. 
G.  Corporations Must Uphold Human Rights 
The time is ripe for ensuring that human-rights standards are 
addressed globally.  As corporations continue to invest in developing 
countries, the United States must perfect its stance on human-rights 
abuses in accordance with internationally accepted norms.234 
First, corporations have a moral duty to abide by human rights, 
as do all other individuals.235  If corporations are owed the same rights 
and protections as people,236 they should owe moral duties to other 
people.237  Like any individual, a corporation should be responsible 
for its conduct.238  It must not kill, injure, or repress.  Corporations 
should not be amoral.  As an integral part of society, corporations 
must abide by society’s moral measures.  Indeed, at least one scholar 
has suggested that corporations should have a higher moral 
responsibility than individuals because they affect more people.239  
The law reflects our conceptions and standards of morality.  
Corporations are not immune from these moral compasses.  Holding 
corporations liable for human-rights abuses under the ATS is an 
important step in solidifying and enforcing corporate morality, just 
like individual morality is codified and enforced. 
Corporate liability under the ATS is also consistent with recent 
trends in international and global law.240  Holding corporations liable 
under the ATS is necessary for the advancement and development of 
human-rights norms throughout the world.241  Modern international 
law favors a determination that entities or individuals other than the 
 
 233  Id. 
 234  See Ratner, supra note 173, at 447.   
 235  See generally John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010).  
 236  See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010).  
 237  Ratner, supra note 173, at 503–04 (“[F]or instance, by working form a moral 
starting point that a corporation has a duty not to invest at all in a repressive society, 
or a duty to ensure that it does not in any way benefit from the government’s lax 
human rights policy.”). 
 238  See generally Ruggie, supra note 235. 
 239  Ratner, supra note 173, at 508. 
 240  See, e.g., id. at 475. 
 241  See Ruggie, supra note 235. 
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states themselves owe human-rights duties to individuals.242  To 
advance this developing norm in the international realm, ATS 
liability must extend to corporations.  Corporations are an integral 
part of the human-rights discussion, and to permit ATS suits against 
them keeps them engaged in the discussion and the development of 
human-rights norms and jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, international law now recognizes non-state and 
individual liability for human-rights abuses.243  States are no longer 
the only actors that violate individuals’ human rights.244  Entities and 
natural persons can harm individuals just as much as states.245  The 
law should respond to this reality.  To achieve this, the law should be 
informed by the understanding that corporations, not states, may be 
in the best position to advance human-rights norms globally.  The 
power of the nation-state is waning while the power of the 
corporation is ever-increasing.  Corporations are multi-national and 
trans-national actors; they cross and transcend borders, laws, and 
norms.  Because some corporations are true supra-national entities,246 
they should be required to uphold and protect liberties and rights 
that transcend national boundaries.  Because they are in a far-
reaching position, corporations may in fact be best suited to bring 
about real change to the way human-rights norms and law are 
respected and upheld across the globe.247 
Critics argue that United States law should not mandate that 
corporations be “conscripted philanthropists.”248  One scholar, 
Donald Kochan argues that while human-rights abuses are certainly 
grave, the ATS is not the appropriate mechanism through which to 
hold corporations accountable.249  He says that all abuses need not 
have specific remedies in American law.250  He further argues that it is 
inappropriate for the government to affirmatively compel, “by 
coercive force,” corporations to act in accordance with prescribed 
 
 242  Ratner, supra note 173. 
 243  Id. at 469. 
 244  Id. at 469 (arguing that “[t]he immense power of the state to cause harm to 
human dignity was revealed as never before in World War II and thus justified the 
continued concentration on rights of individuals against the state”). 
 245  See id. at 477–78. 
 246  See id. at 447–48. 
 247  See id. at 474. 
 248  Donald Kochan, Legal Mechanization of Corporate Social Responsibility Through 
Alien Tort Statute Litigation: A Response to Professor Branson With Some Supplemental 
Thoughts, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 251, 254 (2011). 
 249  See id. at 254–55. 
 250  See id. at 255. 
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moral obligations.251  These concerns are misplaced.  Corporations 
owe a duty to individuals they affect.  The ATS is simply a grant of 
jurisdiction, not a cause of action for breaches of that duty.  It does 
not provide any remedy.  Rather, it serves as a way for plaintiffs to get 
into U.S. courts with the possibility of holding corporations 
accountable for alleged abuses of rights, much like they are held 
accountable for abuses within the United States.  If the United States 
is serious about human rights, it should not permit corporations to 
evade jurisdiction and liability for violating those rights. 
V. THE REAL IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS: 
THERE IS A WAY TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS 
The legal question of whether foreign plaintiffs can sue 
corporate defendants for violations of the law of nations under the 
ATS has been hotly debated and litigated in recent years and is the 
subject of a great scholarly divide.252  The Supreme Court will answer 
this question in its discussion of the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Kiobel, which the parties argued for the second time in late 2012.253  
Although courts and scholars have debated the liability issue 
extensively, there has been little discussion of the real implications of 
holding corporations liable under the ATS.  Frequently, when 
practitioners discuss corporate liability, they argue that public policy 
considerations weigh for or against holding corporations liable under 
the ATS, and the inquiry ends there.254  They oftentimes make 
projections that are unsubstantiated.255  Some of these projections are 
quite severe and have created what amounts to nothing less than 
panic in the corporate world.256  Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas 
 
 251  Id. at 254. 
 252  See supra Part IV. 
 253  See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 17, 2011). 
 254  See, e.g., John B. Henry, Fortune 500: The Total of Litigation Estimated at 1/3 
Profits, THE MET. CORP. COUNSEL (Feb. 1, 2008), 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2008/February/28.pdf; James E. Berger & 
Charlene C. Sun, Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, PAUL HASTINGS, 
September 2011, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/2003.pdf?wt.mc_ID=2003.pdf 
(failing to address the implications for corporations that may be subject to liability 
under the ATS).  
 255  HUFBAUER, supra note 22, at 1. 
 256  Id. at 1 (stating that “[t]his one-sentence law . . . could plausibly culminate in a 
nightmare, more than 200 years after it was enacted” and “corporate lawyers would 
advise the targeted multinational corporations (MNCs) and many other firms to 
curtail their investments, not only in China but also in other (mainly developing) 
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K. Mitrokostas go so far as to say that 
[u]nless checked by Congress or the Supreme Court, trial 
lawyers will seek to expand the scope of ATS awards to such 
an extent that investment and trade in developing countries 
will be seriously threatened.  The ultimate losers will be 
millions of impoverished people denied an opportunity to 
participate in global markets.  Along the way, the United 
States will find itself at loggerheads with traditional allies, 
trading partners, and developing countries.257 
It is important to note that if corporations are not abusing 
human rights abroad, they should not be worried about liability.  This 
section attempts to deconstruct those notions and evaluate the real 
implications of holding corporations liable under the ATS.  Overall, 
the threat to corporations is likely not as serious and adverse as many 
corporate leaders think, and in fact, corporate liability under the ATS 
can produce positive effects for corporations, human rights, and 
foreign relations.258 
A.  Procedural and Practical Limits 
As a preliminary matter, and as discussed above, it is important 
to note that finding that corporations are subject to liability under 
the ATS does not mean that they inevitably will be found liable under 
the particular circumstances of a case.  Allowing corporations to be 
sued in ATS actions merely opens the door to liability—and 
redressability—instead of closing it.  Assuming corporations can be 
sued under the ATS, there will still be many obstacles a plaintiff must 
overcome in order to prove that a corporation is actually liable for a 
violation of the law of nations. 
The number of claims brought under the ATS will not increase 
if the Supreme Court recognizes corporate liability.259  According to 
Sosa, courts cannot invent new causes of action under the ATS.260  
Instead, they must recognize claims under international customary 
law as that law was perceived by the Founders.261  Thus, the types of 
 
countries with less than perfect observance of individual and labor rights and 
shortcomings in the realm of political and environment norms”). 
 257  Id. at 2. 
 258  See infra Parts V.A–F. 
 259  Cf. Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally Sue Locally: 
Trends and Out-of-Control Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
456, 461 (2011). 
 260  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004).   
 261  See id. 
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claims that a plaintiff could potentially bring are inherently limited to 
only those recognized by international law.262  This reality will severely 
limit the number and scope of suits that plaintiffs can bring under 
the ATS.  Although the number of cases brought against corporate 
defendants for violations of the law of nations may increase if courts 
find that corporations can be sued, for all the reasons previously 
stated, there are many factors that will hinder plaintiffs from bringing 
these cases and ultimately prevailing.263  As of 2011, there have been 
155 ATS cases filed against corporations, eighty percent of which 
were filed in the past fifteen years.264  On average, there are 
approximately six to ten new ATS claims filed each year against 
corporations.265  Given that most circuits now allow corporations to be 
sued under the ATS, the number of suits will likely not increase 
substantially, if at all, even if the Supreme Court explicitly recognizes 
corporate liability.  Corporate executives worry that if corporations 
are held liable under the ATS, plaintiffs will be more inclined to file 
frivolous lawsuits.266  In reality, however, ATS cases will still be difficult 
to bring and to prove.267  Accordingly, extending liability to 
corporations in all circuits would not significantly increase the 
number of claims plaintiffs bring against corporate defendants.268 
Plaintiffs will also face considerable procedural and logistical 
bars to bringing and sustaining a claim against a corporate 
defendant.269  In fact, federal courts regularly dismiss ATS cases 
before they actually reach trial.270  As a result, few ATS claims 
involving corporate defendants make it past the summary judgment 
stage and almost none make it to trial, no less to the judgment 
stage.271  Holding that corporations can be sued under the ATS does 
not eliminate the procedural rules already in place for litigation in 
 
 262  See id.  
 263  See supra Part IV.  
 264  Drimmer et al., supra note 259, at 461. 
 265  Id. at 460. 
 266  Berger et al., supra note 254, at 5. 
 267  See Drimmer et al., supra note 259, at 460. 
 268  See id. 
 269  Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate 
Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 981 (2004).  It is nearly impossible to obtain 
figures on the exact number of ATS cases filed and those that are dismissed or 
settled before they reach trial. 
 270  Rosaleen T. O’Gara, Procedure Under the Alien Tort Statute, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 797, 
798 (2011).  
 271  Stanisz, supra note 172, at 598–99.   
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American courts.272  First, in order to persist beyond summary 
judgment or motions to dismiss, a court must have personal 
jurisdiction over the corporate defendant.273  This requirement, 
present in all U.S. cases, may limit the number of claims because U.S. 
courts do not always have personal jurisdiction over a corporate 
defendant.274  Second, a plaintiff claiming a violation of the law of 
nations under the ATS against a corporate defendant will have to do 
so within the applicable statute of limitations.275  Courts can borrow 
the statute of limitations from the TVPA, a similar state statute, or 
international law.276  In most cases, courts will apply the statute of 
limitations from the TVPA to the ATS.277  Thus, in some cases a 
plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed simply because it was not—or could 
not have been—brought within the applicable statute of limitations 
period. 
Third, a claim against a corporate defendant may be subject to 
the requirement that a corporation act in complicity with a state 
actor.278  Some courts have not yet addressed whether corporations 
can be liable absent any state action.279  In many cases, whether 
corporations can be held liable absent state action depends on the 
nature of the underlying claim.280  Fourth, it is important to note that 
many of the claims against corporate defendants will involve political 
questions, which are non-justiciable in U.S. courts.281  Thus, corporate 
 
 272  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 273  Cleveland, supra note 269, 981.  It is important to note that the court must 
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant in accordance with American law—not 
international law: the procedural rules that govern U.S. courts do not disappear 
simply because a plaintiff asserts a violation of international law.   
 274  See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–
03 (1989) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an 
individual liberty interest. . . . Thus, the test for personal jurisdiction requires that 
the maintenance of the suit . . . not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
 275  Cleveland, supra note 269, at 981.  Again, note that the statute of limitations 
for a violation of international law is decided by looking to domestic law, because 
domestic law provides rules for decision-making.  This reality further supports the 
argument that domestic law should govern the question of whether corporations can 
be sued under the ATS.  See id.   
 276  BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATIONS IN U.S. COURTS 148 (1996). 
 277  Id. at 149. 
 278  Cleveland, supra note 269, at 976. 
 279  Id. 
 280  See id. 
 281  Id. at 981. 
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defendants will still be able to argue in each particular case that the 
judiciary is not the proper branch to address the plaintiff’s claim.282  
Instead, the defendant can argue that the Executive branch is more 
properly equipped to handle matters of foreign law and international 
affairs.283  Fifth, some scholars have suggested that a heightened 
pleading standard should apply to ATS cases involving corporations, 
which would help to filter out frivolous cases.284  Regardless of 
whether a heightened standard applies, plaintiffs must still state a 
claim that is plausible on its face, in accordance with the Supreme 
Court’s directive in Twombly and Iqbal.285 
Finally, developing an ATS case is not easy.286  In some ATS cases, 
the plaintiffs, their lawyers, and the defendants are in three entirely 
different locations and as a result gathering information before the 
plaintiffs file a suit can be prohibitively difficult.287  Discovery after the 
complaint is filed is also challenging to obtain because of distance 
and the different, and often hostile, evidentiary rules in foreign 
countries.288  Proving an ATS case at trial oftentimes requires proof by 
circumstantial evidence and expert testimony.289  But even after a 
judgment is entered, plaintiffs may run into difficulty in collecting 
their damage award.290  Many judgments in ATS cases have gone 
uncollected.291  These procedural complications have the potential to 
limit—perhaps even severely—a plaintiff’s claim under the ATS 
against a corporate defendant. 
These procedural bars are subject to the premise that the 
 
 282  See id. 
 283  STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 276, at 144 (“To the extent foreign law may 
apply, the defendant may argue that the case should be dismissed to avoid becoming 
entangled in the difficulties of foreign law.”). 
 284  See Geoffrey M. Sweeney, Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien 
Tort Statute: A Proposal for Evaluating the Facial Plausibility of a Claim, 56 LOY. L. REV. 
1037, 1066–67 (2010); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 285  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 286  See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 276, at 164. 
 287  See id. (“[B]asic information about the plaintiffs, the defendant and the claim 
must be evaluated before deciding whether a lawsuit is legally justified and practically 
feasible.”).  
 288  See id. at 182, 186 (“Defendants have many ways to frustrate discovery.”)  
(“Obtaining evidence from abroad can be a complex and time-consuming process, 
one that often results in clashes between U.S. and foreign authorities.”). 
 289  See id. at 200, 205. 
 290  See id. at 218. 
 291  See id.  
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plaintiff’s action even gets to federal court.292  First, foreign plaintiffs 
are not often in an ideal position to bring a claim against a corporate 
defendant in the United States.293  The reality is that many of the 
potential plaintiffs in ATS actions are simply financially and 
logistically unable to bring a claim.294  Sustaining an ATS claim against 
a corporate defendant requires, first and foremost, knowledge of the 
ATS and the potential recourse available to plaintiffs under the 
statute.295  Without such knowledge, plaintiffs would not know to 
bring a claim in the first place.  In addition, plaintiffs must have the 
financial resources to bring and sustain a claim.296  While many non-
profits may be willing to aid in this regard, it will not be easy for 
plaintiffs to get this financial support or provide it for themselves.297  
It is also important that, regardless of whether the plaintiffs are able 
to obtain outside counsel or help from a non-governmental 
organization (NGO), the costs of putting together a case, discovery, 
and producing testimony from distant countries will often be 
prohibitively high.298 
Second, before a plaintiff can enter a U.S. court, he or she must 
have exhausted his or her remedies in his or her home state, and an 
action in that state must not be preferable to an action in the United 
States.299  Plaintiffs will likely have difficulty sustaining and pursuing 
claims against corporate defendants without pooling resources 
together as a class in a class action.300  To obtain class certification, 
 
 292  See O’Gara, supra note 270, at 798. 
 293  See id. 
 294  Id. 
 295  Id. 
 296  See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 276, at 161 (explaining that “[t]he fact that 
damage awards are usually difficult to collect also makes it hard for private attorneys 
to bring suits, since the work generally must be handled without fee”). 
 297  See id. 
 298  See O’Gara, supra note 270, at 808–09.  While corporations often lament about 
how much litigation costs them, it is important to keep in mind that plaintiffs must 
also bear the burden of their legal expenses.   
 299  See Cleveland, supra note 269, at 981, 986 (noting that forum non conveniens 
principles must still apply); see generally Piper v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) 
(discussing the private and public interest factors weighing in a determination of an 
adequate alternative forum); see STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 276, at 146 (stating 
that “[t]o prove that remedies in the country where the violations occurred need not 
be exhausted, plaintiffs must submit evidence showing that pursuit of a human rights 
claim would be futile, given the weakness of the local judiciary and its inability to 
handle such cases”). 
 300  The requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 23 may not be met easily.  Class 
certification requires numerosity, common questions of law or fact, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  A recent discussion of some of the 
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plaintiffs would have to prove that there are common questions of 
law or fact, that the plaintiffs are too numerous for practical joinder, 
that the class’s representative is adequate, and that the 
representative’s claim is typical to the rest of the class members.301 
Finally, it must be noted that corporations, by virtue of their size 
and power, possess enormous ability to effect change through 
political and media tactics.302  Corporations often have the resources 
and the far-reaching ability to affect public perception through 
media outlets such as news, print, and the Internet.303  Thus, 
corporations cannot claim that liability under the ATS will destroy 
their public image when they have the resources to potentially 
control their own image in the media.304 
Essentially, that plaintiffs may sue corporate defendants does not 
mean that procedural and logistical restraints disappear.  Thus, 
plaintiffs will still likely have a difficult time bringing and sustaining a 
claim against a corporate defendant for a violation of the law of 
nations. 
B.  Litigation Expenses 
Skeptics believe that corporate liability under the ATS will have 
detrimental effects on corporations.305  Scholars have posited that 
holding corporations liable will produce results that could, in 
essence, ruin the U.S. economy.306  These arguments are severely 
misguided, misconceived, and far more dramatic than reality 
suggests. 
Corporate litigation expenses will not dramatically increase as a 
result of allowing corporations to be sued under the ATS.  There is 
no doubt that corporate litigation expense is already high.307  In 2006, 
profits from Fortune 500 companies totaled approximately $610 
billion, of which corporations spent nearly $210 billion on 
litigation.308  Some scholars use this high figure as an argument for 
 
elements of FED. R. CIV. P. 23 can be found in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 
(2011).  
 301  FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 302  Drimmer et al., supra note 259, at, 460–61, 474–79. 
 303  Id. at 474–79. 
 304  Cf. id. 
 305  See, e.g., HUFBAUER, supra note 22, at 1–2. 
 306  Thompson, supra note 42, at 310–11. 
 307  Id. 
 308  Id. at 310–11; see Henry, supra note 254.  Corporations spend an astronomical 
amount of money on litigation.  It is unclear, however, how the global financial crisis 
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why corporations should not be held liable under the ATS.309  But the 
data reflects all litigation expenses, even when the corporation itself 
initiates the suit against an individual or another corporation.310  In 
addition, the data includes litigation expenses for valid claims in 
violation of the law.311  Thus, while the data suggests that corporations 
are victims of predatory lawsuits that drain a large proportion of their 
total profits, the reality is that many of these suits are initiated by the 
corporations themselves.312 
Some scholars project that allowing corporations to be sued will 
result in an additional $200 billion in litigation costs if all claims 
succeed.313  Of course, not all claims will succeed.  Furthermore, it 
should be noted that while corporations must pay their corporate 
counsel to defend against claims, plaintiffs must also bear the burden 
of their legal expenses when they sue a corporation.  There is simply 
no data to suggest that holding corporations liable under the ATS 
will significantly increase this already astronomically high number.  
Finally, one author suggests that allowing corporate liability under 
the ATS shifts the costs too easily to shareholders of U.S. 
corporations.314  Potential liability under the ATS is a factor—just like 
any other—that an investor should consider before investing in a 
multi-national corporation.  Corporate liability should not be limited 
simply because its shareholders will have to bear the burden of that 
liability. 
C.  Settlement Expenses 
There are additional arguments that corporations will suffer 
great loss at the hands of ATS liability.  Commentators argue that 
allowing corporations to be sued under the ATS will produce such 
bad press for corporations that many will seek to settle cases 
immediately.315  In fact, some corporations have settled ATS cases 
before the plaintiff files a complaint for fear that once a complaint is 
filed, the press will be so negative that it would severely impact the 
 
of 2008 changed the situation.  
 309  Drimmer, supra note 259, at 460–61. 
 310  See Henry, supra note 254. 
 311  Cf. id. 
 312  Cf. id. 
 313  Drimmer supra note 254, at 460–61; see generally Gary Hufbauer & Nicholas 
Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 246 
(2004). 
 314  Thompson, supra note 42, at 312.  
 315  Id. at 312. 
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corporation.316  According to these commentators, corporations may 
settle cases—even unmeritorious cases—because, regardless of merit, 
it would cost more to try the case.317  Thus, corporations may pay 
huge sums of money to plaintiffs who do not even have legitimate 
cases, simply because those corporations are worried about the 
financial and public relations consequences of going to trial.318  These 
assumptions are also unfounded.  Despite the fact that most circuits 
recognize corporate liability, only six ATS cases are filed each year.319  
Because it is not likely that federal courts will be inundated with 
corporate ATS cases, for the reasons discussed above, it is unlikely 
that corporations will see a spike in settlement costs. 
D.  Investment Concerns 
Similarly, opponents of corporate liability under the ATS argue 
that corporate liability will severely hinder foreign investment and 
will deter corporations from doing business in foreign countries.320  In 
2003, Hufbauer and Mitrokostas hypothesized that ATS litigation 
would prompt a “conservative” estimate of mass disinvestment in 
developing countries to the tune of $55 billion.321  Hufbauer and 
Mitrokostas projected that this loss in foreign direct investment 
would cause a loss of 380,000 jobs and would “depress overall U.S. 
trade with target countries by 10 percent from current levels.”322  Nine 
years have passed and this doomsday prophecy has not come to 
fruition, despite the fact that most circuit courts today allow 
corporations to be sued.  To the contrary, corporate liability will 
simply force companies to be more aware and attuned to human-
rights abuses abroad and to steer clear of those abuses. There is 
simply no evidence to suggest that corporations will limit investment 
in foreign countries simply because they may be sued under the 
ATS.323  Corporations take risks in order to make a profit.  They will 
 
 316  Telephone Interview with Sander Bak, Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & 
McCoy, LLP (Oct. 26, 2011) (on file with author).  It is important to note that there 
is little reliable information on how much is spent by corporations in settling ATS 
suits, partially because corporations settle these cases for the precise purpose of 
keeping the facts out of public view and partially because the settlements that are 
public do not yield much helpful information.  Id. 
 317  Id. 
 318  See Drimmer, supra note 259, at 465. 
 319  Id. at 461.   
 320  Thompson, supra note 42, at 312. 
 321  HUFBAUER, supra note 22, at 40. 
 322  Id. at 42. 
 323  Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability 
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realize that the economic advantages of investing and operating in a 
foreign country outweigh the risk of being sued under the ATS.324  
Corporations engaged in activities in foreign nations will likely find 
that doing business in that particular country is still financially 
beneficial to the corporation because the benefits from doing 
business there outweigh the risks of being sued.325 
Mere investment in an “authoritarian regime has never been 
sufficient ground for liability under the ATS” and thus will not deter 
companies from investing.326  If corporations are not violating 
customary international law, they should not have to expend large 
sums of money in an effort to comply with such laws and norms.  At 
the same time, allowing corporations to be sued will, to the extent 
that violations exist, create an incentive for corporations to 
implement internal compliance structures within the corporation to 
prevent and limit liability.327  By doing so, corporations will not only 
bolster compliance with human rights abroad, but will also ensure 
that the corporation is a more sound and returnable investment for 
investors back home.  Similarly, corporate constructive 
engagement—the idea that democracy and human rights are best 
transferred through the interaction between individuals and 
corporations from the U.S. and foreign countries—will sweeten the 
climate for investment.328  Corporate adherence to international 
norms will create a more responsible and safe investment 
environment, while also increasing public relations internationally.  
Some scholars argue that investment is better promoted by 
corporations operating in these foreign countries and that in the 
long run, this openness will promote human rights.329  This is a weak 
argument for why corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS.  
The point is not to discourage investment, but rather to encourage 
 
Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 
235 (2008) (“[N]either the Administration nor the business community has . . . 
presented any empirical . . . evidence suggesting that corporations will decline 
significant investment opportunities based on the possibility that they will be held 
liable if they aid and abet human rights abuses in implementing their projects.”). 
 324  Id., at 235; see supra Part IV for a discussion of the barriers to bringing an ATS 
suit that make it difficult for a plaintiff to collect.  
 325  See supra Part IV. 
 326  Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1117, 1139–40 (2001). 
 327  Cleveland, supra note 269, at 980. 
 328  See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human 
Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 274 (2009). 
 329  Id. 
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investment through promotion of human rights and compliance with 
international law. 
E.  Human Rights Implications 
Holding corporations liable under the ATS will encourage the 
spread of democracy and human rights, help develop the law, 
provide an opportunity for social change, and encourage corporate 
compliance to the extent that common goals can be promoted.  
Affording disenfranchised individuals in foreign countries the ability 
to come into contact with the American judicial system provides the 
individual with an experience in which he or she is invited to become 
a participant in the law.330  If we wish to export democracy as a foreign 
policy objective, the ATS is a perfect vehicle for doing so. 
Corporate liability under the ATS will help to develop 
international and domestic law.331  Thus, corporate liability will allow 
courts the opportunity to further develop the law in this area by 
examining the difficult issues corporate liability presents.332  ATS suits 
have already helped to “identify which fundamental international 
rights norms require state action and which do not,” and have 
“inspired the development abroad of mechanisms for human-rights 
enforcement.”333  It is time to move on and accept that corporate 
liability under the ATS exists and has in fact existed for years.  It is 
time to deal with the implications of corporate liability. 
Furthermore, allowing corporations to be sued under the ATS 
will enable the development of international law to the extent that 
individual plaintiffs are permitted to argue what they perceive that law 
to be.334  Currently, international law is the product of states and 
intergovernmental organizations.  Corporate liability under the ATS 
would give individuals a chance to engage in the development of 
international law by bringing lawsuits alleging violations of that law.  
After all, it is often these individuals who are affected by international 
norms of human rights, despite the fact that they oftentimes do not 
have a say in what those norms are.335  Allowing corporations to be 
sued under the ATS will likely increase global familiarity with human-
 
 330  Cf. O’Gara, supra note 270, at 818. 
 331  See Cleveland, supra note 269, at 975; Christiana Ochoa, Identifying and Defining 
CIL Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 105, 116 (2005). 
 332  Cleveland, supra note 269, at 975. 
 333  Id. at 976, 977. 
 334  Ochoa, supra note 331, at 116. 
 335  Id. at 116.  Presently, a norm is only part of international law when nations are 
“persuaded by it.”  See Ramsey, supra note 328, at 275. 
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rights violations and may have the effect of producing wider social 
change and adherence to international and human-rights norms, 
because corporations extend across national and cultural 
boundaries.336  In addition, corporate liability under the ATS will 
encourage corporations to develop—if they have not already—and 
enforce international law compliance rules and structures.337  By using 
potential liability under the ATS as an incentive to implement 
international law compliance regimes, corporations will, in essence, 
become self-executing international law entities.  The force of the 
ATS will ensure compliance.338  Corporate liability under the ATS 
would, and indeed already does, have a direct impact on corporate 
behavior in many developing nations and defines the extent to which 
companies will engage with foreign governments and to what lengths 
those corporations will go to make a profit.339  These human-rights 
implications provide a huge incentive for holding corporations 
accountable for their actions by allowing them to be sued under the 
ATS. 
F.  Foreign Affairs Implications 
Corporate liability under the ATS will not severely damage U.S. 
foreign relations; to the contrary, it has the potential to facilitate 
better international relations between the United States and other 
countries.  The United States often fails to comply with international 
legal norms.340  Corporate liability under the ATS will demonstrate to 
the rest of the world that the United States is serious about 
promoting human rights, promoting the development of civil society 
abroad, and increasing constructive engagement.341 
Corporate liability under the ATS will further the U.S. foreign 
policy goal of promoting human rights abroad.342  One of the original 
purposes of the ATS was to increase the United States’s prestige 
among nations.343  Permitting corporations to be sued under the ATS 
 
 336  See generally Holzmeyer, supra note 152.  
 337  Cleveland, supra note 269, at 980. 
 338  Barsa & Dana, supra note 197, at 94; Herz, supra note 323, at 210. 
 339  Barsa & Dana, supra note 197, at 87. 
 340  Cf. Shirley V. Scott, The Impact on International Law of US Noncompliance, in 
UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 427–28 
(Michael Byers ed., 2003). 
 341  Cf. id. 
 342  Cleveland, supra note 269, at 985. 
 343  See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (Edwards, J., 
concurring); D’Amore, supra note 26, at 597. 
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would further this original purpose.  Specifically, allowing 
corporations to be sued pursuant to international law demonstrates 
to foreign nations that the United States is serious about human 
rights and regards highly international law, so much so that it will 
permit international law to govern actions against U.S. corporations.  
In addition, corporate liability under the ATS brings established 
international human-rights law norms into U.S. jurisprudence and 
encourages the development of law in accordance with international 
human-rights standards. 
Furthermore, corporate liability will promote civil society abroad 
by encouraging constructive engagement.344  One of the United 
States’s foreign policy objectives is to encourage and promote 
democracy and civil society abroad.  Proponents of the constructive 
engagement model argue that by virtue of operating in foreign and 
developing countries and interacting with locals, American 
corporations will convey to those countries and individuals 
democratic principles and the rule of law.345  When corporations 
violate human rights, the engagement is inevitably unconstructive.346  
Thus, holding corporations liable under the ATS ensures that when 
individuals and nations come into contact with U.S. corporations 
abroad, those corporations actually promote and emulate democracy 
and human rights.347  Holding corporations liable under the ATS 
would require corporate officials to explain to foreign governments 
why they cannot engage in certain illegal activities, thereby 
promoting constructive engagement and promoting the formation of 
democratic principles abroad.348  Accordingly, holding corporations 
liable under the ATS is, in reality, a means through which the United 
States can promote the original purpose of the ATS and its foreign 
policy initiatives. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Corporations should be held liable under the ATS for violations 
 
 344  See Ochoa, supra note 329, at 116; Herz, supra note 323, at 209–10. 
 345  Herz, supra note 323, at 209. 
 346  Cf. id. at 237. 
 347  Id. at 223. 
 348  Id. at 228 (stating that liability “will compel companies to explain to 
government and military officials at all levels the reasons it cannot tolerate abuses,” 
namely “that international law and the U.S. legal system forbid complicity in human 
rights violations; that if abuses occur, victims—even the most marginalized 
peasants—are entitled to present evidence in a U.S. court against even the most 
powerful multinational corporations “). 
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of the law of nations in accordance with the D.C. Circuit’s holding in 
Doe VIII.  The Supreme Court should adopt its holding because it is 
not only within the original meaning of the ATS, but it is also the 
correct rule under both international and domestic law.  In 
determining this question, the Supreme Court should look to 
domestic, not international law.  Contrary to what many have feared, 
permitting suits against corporations will not have severe and 
detrimental implications for corporations.  Instead, holding that 
corporations can be sued under the ATS will have a profoundly 
positive impact on human rights and foreign policy without severely 
deterring corporate productivity and investment. 
 
